Abstract. Zahavi's handicap theory, formalized by Grafen, suggests that 'cheaters' must be at a disadvantage if a communication system such as ritualized aggression is to evolve (Grafen 1991, In: Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (Ed. by J. R. Krebs & N. B. Davies), pp. 5-31. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific). To determine whether cheating is disadvantageous in Betta splendens, we held a series of live interactions, after inducing hyper-aggression by socially isolating and then briefly 'priming' the fish. Primed isolates, which were no stronger than their rivals, 'cheated' by escalating rapidly to tailbeating and biting. These cheaters, however, usually lost fights to non-isolated opponents. Unprimed isolates, i.e. socially isolated fish that were not primed, were not initially hyper-aggressive and thus did not cheat. They lost fewer fights than the cheaters. Results suggested that cheaters lost because they exhausted themselves by their hyper-aggressiveness, allowing their non-hyper-aggressive opponents to win. This result is consistent with the Zahavi-Grafen model of how an 'honest' level of ritualized aggression can be stabilized in a population.
Animals usually perform ritualized aggression at an intensity that is predictable from their resource-holding potential (e.g. Davies & Halliday 1978; Clutton-Brock & Albon 1979; Dodson 1989) . Why should evolution select for the honest communication of low resource-holding potential during a fight? Why not 'cheat', by displaying more intensely than normal, and increase the odds of driving off a rival? Zahavi (1979 Zahavi ( , 1987 theorizing about the evolutionary stability of ritualized communication systems, hypothesized that all evolved communicative signals must be costly, so that their performance 'handicaps' a signaller. This idea was formalized by Grafen (1991) , who argued that a stable communication system would evolve only if cheating on the convention (i.e. displaying at an intensity typical of a stronger individual) increased the handicap associated with that particular display. This extra handicap would increase with the degree of cheating. If an escalation in the cost did not exist, a cheater could gain an advantage over honest competitors, and either a predisposition to ignoring the 'cheatable' signal would arise, or the 'cheater' strategy would invade the population. Since stable ritualized communication systems do exist, cheating must be costly, and honesty must pay.
In many cases, it is easy to discover physical constraints that would make cheating on aggressive display conventions costly; to perform more intensely than a rival, an individual must be stronger. The Zahavi-Grafen theory suggests that the handicap principle ought to apply to all cases. Not all aggressive displays have a large energetic cost, however. Although measurements have shown that some aggressive displays do require considerable energy, others do not (Horn et al. 1995) . Moreover, determining which displays are energetically expensive cannot always be based on simple physics. For example, even though the vocal apparatus of song birds is highly acoustically efficient compared to that of crowing of roosters, song birds use much more energy for singing than roosters do for crowing (Horn et al. 1995) . Furthermore, the evidence on whether animals lose by cheating during ritualized fights offers little support for the Zahavi-Grafen model. Studies in which animals were selected for atypical threat intensity, or manipulated into threatening unusually strongly, showed that the
